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We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the 
conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. 
- Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §107 
  
[N]ot aware of what is going on there, not aware of what must be thought in the true 
thinking of Being as a whole, namely, that such thinking is a cry of distress, arising from a 
calamity. 
- Heidegger, Nietzsche, II 
 
The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation. What is called resignation is confirmed 
desperation. From the desperate city you go into the desperate country…  
- Thoreau, “Economy,” Walden 
 
§ 
 
Then how dangerous a loss would a break in our natural history signify? We might try 
imagining our response to one who begins periodically to move through comfortable rooms 
and along sunny, unobstructed sidewalks as though they were fields of ice, or paths along a 
precipice – flailing through an unremarkable corridor, huddling against sides of buildings – 
and who all the while insists that she is going on in the same way she has always done. 
- Stanley Cavell, “The Wittgensteinian Event” 
 
§ 
 
I see the eyes but not the tears 
This is my affliction 
 - T.S. Eliot 
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Lauren Ber lant ’s  Cruel Optimism,  Some Pre l iminary Remarks 
Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism is a work that participates in the “ongoing storytelling” of 
the everyday, an everyday that amounts to how worlds get both made and mediated. 
However, Berlant distinguishes her version of the everyday not as a scene organized by 
capitalism (as “we find in Lefebvre and de Certeau,” e.g.), but rather as “the overwhelming 
ordinary that is disorganized by [capitalism], and by many other forces besides” (8). But why 
this new way of sensing the structure of the everyday? Because, for Berlant, the archive of 
modern everyday life theory, namely the “Euro-modernist concern with the shock of urban 
anomie and mass society… [a register] exemplified by the milling crowd and the 
compensatory consciousness and practice of the flaneur,” is no longer an appropriate mode 
for surveying the conditions of a post-Fordist present posing significantly different contours 
of affective experience. Namely, this contemporary accounting assesses not a world 
population still assimilating to the early shocks and alienations of modern urban life, but one 
facing new demands for survival less shocking than they are “shapelessly” chronic. For 
Berlant, the shock of crisis has become the ongoing normalcy of crises’ flat duration. 
Cruel Optimism marks a turning away from everyday life theory as point of entry, or vehicle, 
towards a translation of the precarious present as “thinking about the ordinary as an impasse 
shaped by crisis in which people find themselves developing skills for adjusting to newly 
proliferating pressures to scramble for modes of living on” (8). (In fact, here the impasse 
becomes the dominant genre of Cruel Optimism, representing the flat but insecure 
temporalities, the longue durée, of ordinary suffering – a present condition we are always in, yet 
always also trying to catch up with and overcome. “In the impasses induced by crisis, being 
treads water; mainly, it does not drown” (10).) One might say, vis-à-vis Berlant, that the 
characteristic gesture of this precarious ordinary, the disorganized  everyday, is not the 
reflexive scanning and collecting of Benjamin’s flaneur, but the scramble – the constant 
entrepreneurship of the self in the name of getting by and/or survival. But why the scramble? 
Berlant explains, as the state has withdrawn “from the uneven expansion of economic 
opportunity” fantasies of “postwar optimism for democratic access to the good life” are 
fraying: “[U]pward mobility, job security, political and social equality, and lively, durable 
intimacy. The set of dissolving assurances also includes meritocracy, the sense that liberal-
capitalist society will reliably provide opportunities for individuals to carve out relations of 
reciprocity that seem fair and that foster life as a project of adding up to something and 
constructing cushions for enjoyment” (3).  
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Lauren Ber lant ’s  Stanley Cavell?   
Describing the zone of capital’s disorganization, Lauren Berlant writes, “This ordinary is an 
intersecting space where many forces and histories circulate and become ‘ready to hand’ in 
the ordinary, as Stanley Cavell would put it, for inventing new rhythms for living, rhythms 
that could, at any time, congeal into norms, forms, and institutions” (9). My aim in this paper 
is to put Berlant and Cavell in conversation in such a manner that might enrich a reading of 
Cruel Optimism, understanding its partial genealogy or prehistory, and it is this reference to 
the Cavellian ordinary that signals the first of two explicit gestures to Cavell; dual references 
that interestingly enough bookend Berlant’s eloquent but demanding book. The other 
explicit moment of Cavell occurs at the conclusion of Cruel Optimism’s final chapter, “On the 
Desire for the Political.” In an uncharacteristically positive paragraph, offering a quick 
outline of some potential techniques for crossing over the very impasse under investigation, 
Berlant suggests “a philosophical pragmatism that involves becoming a political subject 
whose solidarities and commitments are neither to ends nor to imagining the pragmatics of 
consensual community, but to embodied processes of making solidarity itself” (260). And 
what might this look like? Berlant sketches out an assemblage of David Graeber’s 
anthropological neo-anarchism with the localism and neo-communitarianism of J.K. 
Gibson-Graham. “This orientation toward relating politics and the political would be 
something like the… perfectionist position of Cavellian ethics, and something like 
Agamben’s ‘means without end,’ where the pure mediality of being in the present of the 
political and the sensual is what matters” (260). Thus, I propose two general, related sites 
through which we may come to spot Cavell’s influence, or at least his precedent, in Berlant’s 
project: the ordinary, and the “poetics of misrecognition that infuse this ordinary;” as well as 
Cavell’s version of a (moral) perfectionism – his perfectionist orientation. 
Stanley Cavel l ’ s  Sense o f  the Ordinary 
The ordinary is a central and original concept for Stanley Cavell. And “The Uncanniness of 
the Ordinary,” Cavell’s 1986 Tanner Lecture, is a logical place to begin as it explicitly sets out 
to review this central concept. While the essay’s opening gesture situates Cavell’s sense of 
ordinary as somewhat apart from Heidegger’s (e.g. in “the Origin of the Work of Art”), it 
also acknowledges an affinity. According to Cavell, Heidegger’s ordinary goes as follows: 
that the ordinary is extra-ordinary insofar as it is that which constitutes our “common 
habitual world,” yet this composition is flawed for Heidegger as it comes under and is 
influenced by his account of the technological. “[I]t is thus to be seen as a symptom of what 
Nietzsche prophesied, or diagnosed, in declaring that for us ‘the wasteland grows’” (Quest 
154). 
Cavell’s engagement with the ordinary began out of a defense of the work of his teacher, J.L. 
Austin, which is to say Austin’s ordinary language philosophy. For Cavell this means taking 
up the ordinary, at least in part, out of the threat posed to it by philosophical skepticism. But 
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what interests us here, in relation to Berlant’s critical-affective engagement with the 
ordinary, is how Cavell describes the affinity, perhaps the “mutual derivation,” of his sense 
of the ordinary with that of Heidegger’s. Cavell suggests, “[B]oth Heidegger’s view and mine 
respond to the fantastic in what human beings will accustom themselves to, call this the 
surrealism of the habitual… I might describe my philosophical task as one of outlining the 
necessity, and the lack of necessity, in the sense of the human as inherently strange, say 
unstable, its quotidian forever fantastic” (QO, 154). Years later, reflecting on Wittgenstein’s 
ordinary, Cavell would write: “The ordinary occurs essentially in Philosophical Investigations as 
what skepticism denies, and metaphysics transcends, as it were a fictional place produced by 
philosophy’s flight from everyday ungroundedness or prejudices or fixations” (195). 
Perfec t ionism 
Regrettably, there is not the space in this paper to take up a proper consideration of 
Cavellian perfectionism and perfectionist ethics, particularly in relation to Cruel Optimism. 
What follows is a merely an introduction to the concept.  
We will come to see how the perfectionist orientation will relate back to Cavell’s sense of the 
ordinary: namely, with the problem of skepticism and its overcoming - that to be a self, “a 
human individual,” one must be capable of relating to oneself in a variety of ways, “including 
that of adopting a detached or impartial perspective upon oneself; one can thereby take an 
interest in oneself as having attained a particular state and as capable of moving beyond that 
state” (Mulhall Cavell 15). When the capacity of the perfectionist orientation is active, the self 
becomes engaged in an “endless process of self-development- endless because every attained 
state of the self neighbors a further, unattainable but attainable state which forms its 
horizon, its possible future” (Mulhall 14). Cavell describes this process as the “evaluation of 
a way of life, of a stance toward one’s life as such rather than toward individual course of 
conduct” (Tomorrow 120). However, this capacity is not always necessarily active – of course 
this is one of the grave lessons exhibited by Cruel Optimism; in other words, it can certainly 
become eclipsed. Whether the capacity is eclipsed by holding on to the material conditions 
of the state one is already in, or the by the overwhelming present moment (the experience of 
scrambling to meet the ongoingness of the overwhelming present), or by the blindness of 
cruel optimism, or “by the efforts of oneself or others to disguise the attractions of one’s 
neighboring, unattainable but attainable self” (Mulhall 14) – varies from case to case, but 
regardless, what is at stake for both Cavell, and Lauren Berlant, is that the “eclipse of that 
openness to the unattained future amounts to the eclipse of the self’s capacity to grow, to 
change itself in the name of a better… state of self and of society” (Berlant 157).  
Certainly, this kind of perfectionist statement is complicated by the intricate workings of a 
false optimism whose fantastic forms of a better (normative?) future already serve to eclipse 
the subject’s capacity to change, thus maintaining its hindrance within the impasse. That kind 
of optimism for the future anterior (the good life-to-come) would have to be distinguished 
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from the perfectionism I am glossing here. Nevertheless, what I think is important to 
grasp is how the loss of this capacity for an endless self-development is, as the critic Stephen 
Mulhall describes it, “the loss of an essential aspect of selfhood – the capacity to set and 
pursue, but particularly to revise, one’s conception of the good” – or, in Berlant’s, of the 
good life, that is, the visibility of a better good life (14). In other words, what is at stake is the 
loss of positive forms of aspirational life. 
Berlant ’s  “Cris is  Ordinariness” & Cavel l ’ s  Ordinary 
Cruel Optimism also registers its author’s dissatisfaction with the genres/modes of catastrophe 
and trauma for characterizing the historical present. Berlant’s sense is that a more common 
and ubiquitous mode of adaptation to the systemic crises of the everyday is needed; she calls 
this counter-notion “crisis ordinariness” and it is designed to counter the genre of crisis 
which is critiqued as “a heightening interpretative genre, rhetorically turning an ongoing 
condition into an intensified situation” (7). On the contrary, the genre of crisis ordinariness 
captures the sense in which “crisis is not exceptional to history or consciousness but a 
process embedded in the ordinary that unfolds in stories about navigating what’s 
overwhelming” (10). This navigation of the ordinary happens through an ongoing “logic of 
adjustment” distinguished from trauma’s merger of “the intense with the exceptional and the 
extraordinary.” In other words, for Berlant, trauma is a specialized style, capable of 
managing only a limited number of events (10, emphasis mine). What’s more, these singular 
intensities of “an event” spread out into “modes, habits, or genre of being” in the world – 
and it is these modes of living that pervade and compose the ordinary. This what Alex 
Lockwood has in mind when calling attention to the concept’s “non-dramatic potentials” 
(2). 
This diffused and “quieter” affect of the ordinary, a scale and temporality precluded by 
trauma is found at the heart of a short paper by Stanley Cavell titled “The Ordinary as the 
Uneventful,” in which he claims, “there is a history of the human being to which we are 
blinded by the traditional histories of flashing, dramatic events” (Cavell 255). Elsewhere 
Cavell suggests that the ordinary is manifested in its “unremarkableness (the missableness), 
together with the remarkableness (the unmistakability) of [it]” (Tomorrow 25). The crisis 
ordinary of precarious life and labor, in Cruel Optimism, is an unremarkable genre, and its very 
missability takes place - in part - because of how crisis gets spread out and diffused 
throughout the day-to-day of the ordinary and “its situations of living on” (81); how so often 
the the unmistakable suffering of the everyday is simply bypassed or missed. It is for these 
reasons Berlant claims: “Long-term problems of embodiment within capitalism, in the 
zoning of the everyday, the work of getting through it, and the obstacles to physical and 
mental flourishing, are less successfully addressed in the temporalities of crisis and require 
other frames for elaborating contexts of doing, being, and thriving” (105). 
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Berlant’s sense of the ordinary as a space and temporality of low-grade, sustained crisis 
management also connects to her concept of “slow death.” Slow death is developed 
alongside crisis ordinariness as a method to “conceptualize contemporary historical 
experience, especially where that experience is simultaneously at an extreme and in a zone of 
ordinariness, where life building and the attrition of human life are indistinguishable, and 
where it is hard to distinguish modes of incoherence, distractedness, and habituation from 
deliberate activity, as they are all involved in the reproduction of predictable life” (104). Slow 
death is an experience of precarity, and I am interested to juxtapose this sense of slow 
death/precarity with what Cavell calls Wittgenstein’s counter-myth to that of the expulsion 
from Eden (Investigatons, §107): “We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and 
so in a sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk” 
(qtd. in Tomorrow 196). Cavell notes that for Wittgenstein this inability to walk represents a 
“break in our natural history” (citing §25 where walking is listed as “part of our [human] 
natural history”), he interprets “unable to walk” “not as the description of some specific 
failure” but as “a symbolic expression” in this case “something about our inability to move 
ourselves in accordance with our apparent desires” (197).  
How else might we understand this “natural history of the human”? Cavell suggests, again 
vis-à-vis Wittgenstein, that what distinguishes the human from other forms of life is “that 
the human is the animal that is unnatural…fated to chronic dissatisfaction with its lot – 
unless you wish to say that the compulsion to escape the human lot, to overcome the 
human…is precisely what is natural to the human” (208). That the compulsion to overcome 
this dissatisfaction is “natural” to the human becomes a provocative statement in the context 
of Cruel Optimism. For example, how do we read this notion within a thick schema (Berlant’s) 
that suggests those caught in the double bind of cruel optimism (which seems to be most of 
us still faintly touched by a “good life” fantasy, but especially working class folks bound up 
in an attachement to the normative promises of middle class life) are unable to overcome 
their dissatisfaction? In other words, does the precarious contemporary imply an 
impossibility of this overcoming, and what does this mean for being human today? 
Furthermore, how might this impasse alter everything that is modern and optimistic in how 
Cavell reads? 
The Cris i s  Ordinary ,  II 
Cavell’s “Uncanniness of the Ordinary” lecture is rich, and one convenient point of entry 
would be his initial gloss of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” If “The Purloined Letter” is “a 
tale in which something is missed just because it is obvious,” a tale of missing what is in 
plain view, “as if a little too self-evident, a little too plain to notice, as [if] it were beneath 
notice,” then crisis ordinariness would be of this tale’s genre. Not a state of exception, nor 
its opposite, “mere banality” in Berlant’s language, but a “domain where an upsetting scene 
of living is revealed to be interwoven with ordinary life after all, like ants discovered 
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scurrying under a thoughtlessly lifted rock” (102). Cavell’s ordinary becomes that which 
is hidden in plain view, and again this is its very (un)remarkableness. Even more apropos is 
how the summoning of such a tale leads Cavell to this remark of Wittgenstein’s, from the 
Philosophical Investigations: “The aspect of things that are most important for us are hidden 
because of their simplicity and ordinariness. (One is unable to notice something – because it 
is always before one’s eyes) [§129]” (qtd. in Quest 164). 
Listening for the resonances with Berlant’s topography of the everyday ordinary, I note 
Cavell’s interest in how Wittgenstein – in a way for Cavell that is characteristic of the 
Investigations – speaks to us “quite as if we have become unfamiliar with the world, as if our 
mechanism of anxiety, which should signal danger, has gone out of order, working too much 
or too little” (Quest 165-166). This strangeness is something like cruel optimism’s attachment 
to the “compromised conditions” of an ordinariness whose presence – it’s unseen actualities 
– actually threatens the well-being and thriving of the subject. Nonetheless, the attachment 
cannot be abandoned for, in Berlant’s formulation, the subject “might not well endure the 
loss of their object/scene of desire” (24). Once more, part of the dilemma here is how to a 
precarious subject caught within cruel optimism’s double bind, their suffering is not unlike 
how Cavell presents the blurring of “countless moments” in the Investigations – “we are made 
uncertain” if they are “remarkable or casual” (166); this is the shared ambivalence of the 
ordinary in Cavell and Berlant. 
Additionally, I am reminded of an essay entitled “Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow,” 
where amongst other things, Cavell is curious to read the “surface of containment” and the 
“imagination of the social” in Jane Austen’s novels. He is inclined to juxtapose the 
emotionality and distress of Nietzsche and, yes, Jane Austen and manages to do so in the 
following manner: “You might say that [Austen’s] prose seeks incessantly to minimize 
(hence maintain) the expression of distress in everyday existence no less drastically than 
Nietzsche’s seeks to maximize” (Tomorrow 124). Alongside this unlikely pairing, I want to ask 
does not Berlant’s prose (its genre) normalize distress in ways perhaps “no less drastic” than 
those writers who excite Cavell? Or maybe this is ineluctable (by way of the genre); that the 
very definition of precarity could be the normalization of distress, the ordinary crisis of 
getting on in the longue durée. Whatever we make of precarity’s forms, it is nonetheless a 
testament to how well Berlant writes, namely how well she writes genre into being. 
We Find Ourse lves  on a Stair  
In the opening pages of Cruel Optimism, Berlant sets the stage for her observation (her sense) 
of the historical present: tracking the “emergence of a precarious public sphere” the “book is 
about what happens to fantasies of the good life when the ordinary becomes a landfill for 
overwhelming and impending crises of life-building and expectations whose sheer volume so 
threatens what it has meant to ‘have a life’ that adjustment seems like an accomplishment” 
(3).  
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I would like to position alongside Berlant’s portrait of the precarious public sphere a 
passage from Emerson’s essay “Experience,” one which Cavell is fond of quoting: “Where 
do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and believe that it 
has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us, which we seem to 
have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward and out of sight” 
(Tomorrow 99). 
I am tempted to read this passage as an almost proto-affective measure (or anticipation) of 
the atmosphere Berlant creates in Cruel Optimism. “On the stair” is a space-time of constant 
flux and movement, and it seems to me that the figure on this stair could almost be that of 
the freelancer, a figure taken up by Berlant in her reading of William Gibson’s Pattern 
Recognitions. “[T]he freelancer is one of the sovereign figures of neoliberalism, the person on 
contract, who makes short-term deals for limited obligation and thrives through the hustle 
over the long haul…[preferring] entrepreneurial precarity to the too closeness of the world” 
(76). The freelancer is in motion, typically, generically, and her life becomes the experience 
of “migration from one place to another.” The precariat can then be seen to embody a 
movement that actually goes somewhere, as in the case the “thriving” freelancer, or to 
embody a more static tempo such as the low-down hustle of the precarious everyday, where 
one exhausts oneself in the scramble, but never really gets anywhere: “In a race to jog in 
place, to not lose a step, or trip: to maintain – no, attain – composure;” that a present to 
“which we are always catching us is the way we live now” (59). This way of reading Emerson’s 
fragment takes it as an adequate description of trying to make a life under “that porous 
domain of hyperexploitative entrepreneurial atomism that has been variously dubbed 
globalization, liberal sovereignty, late capitalism, post-Fordism, or neoliberalism” (Cruel 
Optimism 167). 
Modernism -  “Everyday Life  Theory” -  Lauren Ber lant 
As I’ve already acknowledged, Berlant locates herself within a historical present where 
something epistemologically different is required from everyday life theory (“from Simmel 
through Benjamin, Lefebvre, and Nigel Thrift”). Beyond that distinction, I am curious to put 
Berlant’s differentiation of her own idiom/work from those such as critic Harry 
Harootunian in conversation with how Stanley Cavell articulates his sense of the ordinary, of 
what the ordinary can do, as a response to the threat of philosophical skepticism. In other 
words, that the discovery of “exactly what” skepticism would deny, namely the ordinary 
everyday, is perhaps akin to what for Berlant gets lost in the “old [and hereby inadequate] 
structuralisms of the before and after” (69).  
In “The Wittgensteinian Event,” Cavell writes, “The ordinary occurs essentially in 
Philosophical Investigations as what skepticism denies, and metaphysics transcends, as it were as 
fictional place produced by philosophy’s flight from everyday ungroundedness or prejudices 
or fixations” (Tomorrow 195). It is beside this characteristic utterance from Stanly Cavell – so 
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central to his thought – that I want to consider Berlant’s methodology (her “sensual 
idiom… of reading the historical through its affective utterance in a present encounter”), a 
methodology borne out of discouragement with what she perceives as an ongoing disrespect 
for “what’s apprehensible in the ordinary” (69). 
Returning to Cavell, “The everyday is what we cannot but aspire to, since it appears to us as 
lost to us” (Quest 171). This statement is interesting in how it both captures Berlant’s desire 
to recover the ordinary, but, I think, also appeals in an uncanny way to the notion of the 
aspirational good life (or any life, for that matter – as long as it is one that promises), a 
fantasy that is kept up amidst its own atmospheric dissolution. And by “Berlant’s desire to 
recover the ordinary” I simply mean her rejection that the ordinary must be conceived of as 
in suspension, or unavailable to criticism and thus beyond apprehension. 
A reading of the (historical) present as lost to us, or inaccessible, would be located by Stanley 
Cavell as already in Thoreau’s Walden where Thoreau described Walden/Walden as the 
“present experiment” - meaning both the book we can now read, but also “that the 
experiment is the present, that is, that the book set itself to test ways of arriving at the 
present, not merely at what people call ‘current events,’ which for [Thoreau] are not current, 
but old news, and are not events, but fancies” (Quest 171). For Cavell then, under the sign of 
Wittgenstein and Thoreau, “there is nothing beyond the succession of each and every day; 
and grasping a day, accepting the everyday, the ordinary, is not a given but a task” (Quest 171, 
emphasis mine). By now it should be obvious that grasping (sensing) the ordinary is the task 
of Cruel Optimism, a book which undertakes the project of redescribing “the something 
developing within the geopolitical field that makes itself known as unstable, if not in crisis” 
(69). And testing new ways of arriving at the present is what Lauren Berlant must do if she is 
to ask these questions of the now: “What constitutes continuity amid the pressure of 
structural inconstancy? What is the good life when the world that was to have been delivered 
by upward mobility and collective uplift that national/capitalism promised goes awry in front 
of one? What is life when the body cannot be relied on to keep up with the constant flux of 
new incitements and genres of the reliable, but must live on, maintaining footing, 
nonetheless?” (69). Still, for Berlant the present is not just an experiment, it is also a state 
that cannot name its own condition, for to do so would likely be to admit its own defeat, its 
own abandonment or paralysis, its “inheritance of an impossible life” (187).  
How interesting it might be to consider Cavell’s prescriptions as anticipating both the 
ordinary everyday ethnographies of Cruel Optimism, but also a larger body of work whose 
“inception” Berlant identifies with the Deleuzian strain in Jameson’s work, and now 
elaborated “by theorists like [Kathleen] Stewart and [Brian] Massumi,” which looks 
“differently at the contemporary everyday, as movements within the present demand 
different dramas of adjustment and sensual self-development from the capitalist modes of 
the past” (69). (Or perhaps my conjecture is that Cavell would not necessarily be a 
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previsional figure for these thinkers, but a kind of curious, though pertinent if not 
unavoidable, “avuncular” relation.)  
Here, I’ve offered up a consideration of Cavell’s view of how (the malady of) skepticism 
brings us, in his tradition, to the “discovery” of the everyday. The “senses of Stanley Cavell” 
means a sensing of the present’s disarray – of how the ordinary escapes us through a loss of 
proximity to it, and how we tend to escape ourselves when inhabiting a milieu that itself feels 
lost. In this light, Cavell’s apprehension of the not eventless but uneventful ordinary is useful 
in adding another layer to Berlant’s construction of the everyday, or in comprehending how 
she has approached it and from where. 
Notes on Genre ,  and the Waning o f  Genre (A Concluding Sect ion)  
In Cruel Optimism, all genre is filtered through the book’s main genre – “the impasse.” 
Through the generic screen of impasse, genre old and new is tested by the temporalities and 
topographies of precarity. In a precarious situation (i.e. a new, developing genre of 
compromised “social time and practice”), social relations and relations of habitude and 
habitation are felt to be shifting, yet the rules for habitation and narrative are “unstable, in 
chaos” (6). For a subject of cruel optimism, one who inhabits the precarious, the situation 
comedy is an ironic aspiration and a dangerous fantasy – hardly applicable to the real stakes 
(for some) of getting by today. (Recall, that for Berlant the “situation comedy” portrays a 
world never “too destabilized” by a situation, and though things turn out wrongly nothing 
significant is ever lost in this comic process.) On the other hand is “the menacing new 
realism” of the “situation tragedy,” revealing a tableau in which the “subject’s world is fragile 
beyond repair, one gesture away from losing all access to sustaining fantasies: the situation 
threatens utter, abject unraveling” (6). Shifts in genre, Berlant explains, can direct us to new 
techniques of sensing “improvisations with the ordinary,” and in this formulation it follows 
that “supermodernity/ neoliberalism produces the situation tragedy as a way of expressing 
the costs of what’s ordinary now” (291 n19).  
Cruel Optimism finds the situation tragedy exemplified in two films, Rosetta and La Promesse, by 
the Dardenne brothers. “In the Dardennes’ films, the formal achievement of genre and 
gender suggets not success but survival, a survival reeking of something that partakes of the 
new generic hybrid, situation tragedy: the marriage between tragedy and situation comedy 
where people are fated to express their flaws episodically, over and over, without learning, 
changing, being relieved, becoming better, or dying”(177).  Here, the young protagonists, 
Igor and Rosetta, occasionally display “heart-wrenchingly” the desire to live as though 
inhabiting the stable boundaries of the situation comedy. But these are scenes of cruel 
optimism, for the situation comedy imagines a world with “the kind of room for us that enables us 
to endure,” yet as the reader of Cruel Optimism understands, and the precarious cinema of the 
Dardennes tragically displays, this kind of capacious and forgiving world is not the inhabited 
world now named the precarious public sphere (177).  
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However, it doesn’t seem that Lauren Berlant has given all precarious genre over to the 
tragic. In Cruel Optimism’s final chapter Berlant takes up the counterdramatics of American 
guerilla art activists, the Surveillance Camera Players. In their do-it-yourself, provisional 
aesthetics she identifies a comic project that actuates a kind of recuperation of an ordinary 
perceived as too-thick, fixed, and nonporous. With the Surveillance Camera Players’ antics 
Berlant describes a version of resistance, or refusal, one that refuses to “allow the security 
state’s saturation of the ordinary to go without saying.” In this recovery of the everyday 
framing of contemporary ambient citizenship the players perform (produce?) a “most 
powerful pedagogy” by staging a disruptive “cheerleading [with which comedy] can 
contribute in order to motivate the body politics to perform intimate, physical, live 
reciprocity in the ordinary spaces of life itself” (244). In closing, I will propose that the 
minor space that Berlant holds open for DIY comic projects can then be understood as a 
space that reopens the possibility of a perfectionist orientation to oneself and one’s scene 
and also as a context with which to view the long consideration Stanley Cavell has given to 
another optimistic genre – the comedy of remarriage. 
To go back in time, and therefore back in (economic) history, we encounter this much 
studied genre of Cavell’s. Emerging from the Depression, these are Hollywood films of the 
1930s and 1940s – “the genres of remarriage comedy [which] comprise the best comedies of 
the golden age of Hollywood cinema” (Tomorrow 120). The comedy of remarriage also 
returns us our initial theme, that of the ordinary; Cavell, for example, concludes “The 
Uncanniness of the Ordinary” with a reading of George Stevens’ 1942 Woman of the Year 
because for him the film is exemplary insofar as it is “symptomatic of everyday thinking.” 
Yet here too is the element of refusal we discover in Berlant’s comic resistance, for Cavell’s 
real interest in Woman of the Year is how it is also “symptomatic of the everyday recognition 
that our habitual modes of thought are destructive, and as an everyday effort to step back 
from them” (Quest 170).  
What is unique to this genre of comedy will also allow us to circle back to Cavell’s place in 
the opening of Berlant’s text, to that optimistic moment where the “ordinary is an 
intersecting space where many forces and histories circulate and become ‘ready to hand’… 
for inventing new rhythms for living” (Cruel Optimism 9), but also in considering that what is 
unique to these films is their potential study of “the possibility of a perfectionist life in a 
democracy,” in a moment where modification and/or reinvention is still possible (Tomorrow 
120). What is unique could then be described as how this moment in Hollywood cinema 
offered a vision, albeit shot as luxurious and bourgeois, of reclaiming and redefining the 
parameters of the ordinary. Cavell writes, “So far as I know, the happiness of [re]marriage is 
dissociated from any a priori concept of domesticity (you might also call marriage in these 
films the taking of mutual pleasure without concept – whether two people are married does 
not necessarily depend on what age they are, or what gender, or whether legally).” And he 
continues, “Marriage here is being presented as an estate meant not as a distraction from the 
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pain of constructing happiness from a helpless, absent world, but as the scene in which 
the chance for happiness is shown as the mutual acknowledgement of separateness, in which 
the prospect is not for the passing of years (until death parts us) but for the willing repetition 
of days, willingness for the everyday” (Quest 178). Cavell’s optimism for transformation 
corresponds to the fleeting optimism of Berlant, an optimism that would not be cruel. 
Following Lockwood, this is the shared hope that the writing (the analysis, or the present 
experiment) will “incite others to analyze the crises of the present moment” (2). And for 
Berlant, that in the perfectionist passage opened up, as in Cavell’s reading of the remarriage 
comedy, one may experiment with “new idioms of the political, and of belonging itself, 
which requires debating what the baselines of survival should be in the near future, which is 
now, the future we are making” (262). 
As former fantasies of “state-liberal-capitalist” security and normalcy wane, we find 
ourselves in a zone of uncertainty and ambivalence as we no longer know what it means to 
“have a life,” and to have a life that both makes sense and makes a living. This at least is the 
guiding principle of Cruel Optimism, and the affective recording of a precarious atomism 
released from familiar institutional “assurances.” Whether Cavell’s comedy of remarriage has 
anything to teach the contemporary is a question to be posed; as are Stanley Cavell’s 
economics and his sense of political economy. If his comic genres are exceptional in their 
Fordism, or their literary Romanticism, or their mid-century optimism then they may be 
irrevocably lost to us. However, my suspicion is that this is not entirely the case, and with 
Lauren Berlant I am holding out that something can be salvaged from both Cavell’s ethics 
and his ways of reading. For one thing, in the comedy of remarriage “nothing legitimizes or 
ratifies marriage – not state, or church, or sex, or gender – apart from the willingness for 
reaffirmation, which is to say remarriage… [a] diurnal devotedness that involves friendship, 
play, surprise” (Tomorrow 121-122). However unlikely it may seem, the comedy of remarriage 
may still have something to teach the post-Fordist scene – this time of scavenging (longing?) 
for genre in the presence of its absence; and finally and not least that one, optimistically, 
remains teachable, and thus can turn, can do or not do. 
The loss of presentness - of a world, of a milieu, or of genre – all are reminiscent of the 
violence done by skepticism “and its desperation to correct” so thoughtfully studied by 
Stanley Cavell. That the loss of presentness births tragedy is an old story, and one that Cruel 
Optimism demonstrates has only intensified in this time of sprectral late liberalism. Lauren 
Berlant’s book should then be read as a “book of losses,” which is also how Stanley Cavell 
once described Walden. What’s more, is that both books begin with statements of departure. 
For Walden, in the creation of its own region (Walden Pond), thus a genre of itself, 
represented “everything there is to lose, and the book opens with it gone, forgone” (Quest 
171). And elsewhere Cavell writes, “ Walden was always gone, from the beginning of the 
words of Walden… [O]ur relation to the world is no longer secured by the world” (Senses 
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119). (Emerson’s “complex structuring concept for this departure is abandonment, 
abandonment of and to… the world” (Quest 175).)  
Thus Walden and Cruel Optimism are also books of mourning: the mourning of the promises 
of a nation and its original expression of liberty, the mourning of economy, and the 
mourning of the aspirational Fordist “good life.” Lauren Berlant, in mourning for our lives, 
mourns the normalcy and normativity of our quiet desperation. The only ordinary optimism 
then, in either Cavell or Berlant, is to focus one’s attention to “the homonymic sound 
‘mo(u)rning,’ meaning both dawning and grieving, [for] we are being told that every 
illumination of the world we have been party to has passed away and is something we must 
learn to rid ourselves of, say to reevaulatue, to recount, to mourn” (Tomorrow 119). This is 
Berlant’s insistence that to “belong to the normal world is to misrecognize only certain 
modes of intelligibility as expressing one’s true self” (125) and that is through a poetics of 
Cavellian recognition of and in the ordinary that something could become ready to hand for 
inventing new forms of relation, “new rhythms of living.” 
For Cavell, the potentiality of mo(u)rning is in its “aversive nature,” which is Emerson’s 
term for the kind of turning at stake; it is that which is “averse to the demand of 
conformity” (Tomorrow 117). This is the sense of finding oneself “in contradiction to [one’s] 
today.” Cavell writes, “Nietzsche also explicitly in this matter invokes the image of turning, 
as in Emerson’s ‘aversion,’ challenging his reader to a ‘reversal [Umkehrung] of one’s habitual 
estimation and esteemed habits’ (of what I earlier called our interests and our sense of what 
is important)” (117). The moment of mo(u)rning/turning locates what is potentially 
extraordinary about the ordinary, and joins with Cavell’s reading of Nietzsche’s philosopher 
- that man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow – which approximates the German 
Morgen and Übermorgen. And to what end? That if we “[t]ake Morgen in its sense of morning, as 
well as of tomorrow,  we may discern an idea of an after-, or over-, or super-morning… 
[t]hen the idea is that the further- or over-morning is the day realized, reconceived” (118). 
What then could it mean that, following Nietzsche and Cavell, the potentiality of a moment 
of mo(u)rning would be to create a world out of nothing, rather than “creating a nothing out 
of the world [aus der Welt ein Nichts schaffen]” (129)? Perhaps this is what Cavell had in mind 
when suggesting that “learning mourning may be the achievement of a lifetime” (172). 
 “To allow the world to change, and to learn change from it, […] accepting its own 
strangeness, are conditions of knowing it now,” is how Stanley Cavell closes his Senses of 
Walden (119). First though, we must acknowledge Berlant’s dilemma: the double bind of a 
good life fantasy that not only endangers but cannot be dispelled, nor is truly attainable. 
Then, with Chekhov, we might say, as commonplace, “I am in mourning for my life.” That 
“placing a lost self in a land that is gone is an exercise of mourning” (Cavell Reply 590). From 
this position I do not know to what or where. If I could only begin to decelerate the 
exhausting and too-rapid dressage of “getting by,” or somehow suspend its anxiety for 
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awhile, I might inquire as to care and the nature of friendship, the locatedness of it. I 
might even inquire into friendship as a way of life. I might ask of my friends, those near to 
me, what it is we shall do, about it, together. “It”? That being the near future, the common 
ordinary which is here and all around us; the historical now which is nothing more than the 
proximate– to inquire how it might be distorted on “behalf of what the present can become” 
(Cruel Optimism 163).  
 
 
 
 
In a moment of crisis ordinariness, anything can be reanimated: but the profoundly 
transformative cause remains elusive, as though so much fraud and betrayal homogenizes 
the pitch without adding up to something. The time without genres of the event is the time 
when the narratives fade toward the lyric. 
 
- Lauren Berlant, “Austerity, Precarity, Awkwardness” 
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